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 Abstract. There has been a steady rise in the prevalence and frequency of impro-
vised Explosives Devices (IED) to execute terror attacks in Kenya in the recent past. 
This has resulted in increased loss of lives and massive property destruction, 
among other negative impacts of terrorism. The purpose of this article was to ascer-
tain the prevalence of IEDs, hotspots, targets of attack, the distribution of the at-
tacks over the years and the geolocations of deployed IEDs and related terrorist at-
tacks in Garissa County, Kenya. The target population was serving members of the 
National Police Service (NPS), civil society organizations (CSO), national govern-
ment administrative officers (NGAOs) and members of the local community. The 
researcher adopted a descriptive survey research design. Mixed sampling methods 
were adopted. Stratified sampling was used to cluster members of NPS, according 
to their Services which include: Kenya Police, Administration Police and Directorate 
of Criminal Investigation. Purposive sampling was used to select Sub-counties for 
the study and identify critical informants from CSO, NGAO and members of local 
communities. Questionnaires, Focus Group Discussions and key informants’ inter-
views guides were used to collect both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantita-
tive data was analyzed by the use of simple descriptive statistics like percentages, 
frequencies. 
In contrast, qualitative data were analyzed using open coding to generate themes 
that the researcher analyzed using thematic analysis. The results were presented 
using tables, pie charts, bar graphs, and narratives. The study observed that Garissa 
County, Kenya, had not been spared by the brunt of the IED menace mainly orches-
trated by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group. The study further noted that IEDs kill thou-
sands every year, inflict grievous physical injuries, cause dire psychological harm, 
spread extreme fear, and disrupt communal economic activities. IEDs mainly target 
security forces and critical national infrastructure members, and most often than 
not, civilian casualties have been reported. 
Moreover, IEDs are relatively cheap and easy to assemble. They can also be assem-
bled anywhere and from various materials, including commercial explosives used in 
construction, mining, and manufacturing. Therefore, the study will add practical val-
ue to the Kenya security agencies security operations preparedness body of 
knowledge. This is expected to guide them in developing effective and efficient 
Counter IED policies, strategies, and guidelines to enhance the efforts to combat 
this security menace. 
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There has been a rise in the prevalence and fre-
quency of Improvised Explosives Devices (IED) 
attacks in Kenya. IEDs kill hundreds, inflict griev-
ous physical injuries to many, lead to the destruc-
tion of property, cause dire psychological harm, 
spread extreme fear, and other adverse effects 
like disrupting economic activities. In most cases, 
the IEDs are deployed to target security forces 
and critical national infrastructure (NCI). How-
ever, in some instances, civilian casualties fall in-
to the trap. IEDs are relatively cheap and easy to 
assemble. They can be assembled anywhere and 
from various materials, including commercial 
Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2021. Vol. 7. No 10  ISSN 2413-9009 
Section “Law and Security”   1002 
explosives used in construction, mining, and 
manufacturing. Industrial fertilizers are the pri-
mary source of its inventory. This article exam-
ines the prevalence of IEDs, hotspots, targets of 
attack, the distribution of the attacks over the 
year and the geolocation of IEDs and related ter-
rorist attacks in Garissa County, Kenya. 
 
Literature review 
The menace of Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs) is a global problem. The use of IEDs by 
terrorist groups is unceasingly causing political 
instability by pursuing ideological and religious 
motives. When IEDs blast, they injure, maim and 
kill thousands every year, cause severe physical 
injuries, cause dismal psychological harm, and 
spread terror and distraction across affected 
groups [14]. Their effect on the security and sta-
bility of the affected states is intense. IEDs im-
pede the political, social, and economic expan-
sion of a country and block lifesaving charitable 
aid. Therefore, there is a need for security forces 
globally to be adequately prepared to deter, pre-
vent, and respond to their use to minimize social, 
economic, and psychological impacts associated 
with them. In the simplest sense, IED refers to 
any homemade bomb assembled from military 
or non-military components and employed by 
insurgents, terrorists, and other non-state actors 
as an unsophisticated but effective weapon 
against an intended target [3]. IEDs consists of an 
initiating mechanism, a detonator, an explosive 
charge, and a casing of projectiles (such as ball-
bearing or nails) that produces fragments upon 
detonation. They can be constructed from artil-
lery or mortar rounds, certain types of fertilizers, 
and other commercial explosives. IEDs are acti-
vated by various methods, including remote 
switches, infrared or magnetic triggers, pressure-
sensitive bars, or tripwires [3]. The ease of mak-
ing IEDs’ and the harm associated makes it a pre-
ferred weapon for terrorists as such many terror-
ist groups employ IEDs for their targets. From 
this perspective that police as security agents and 
the military need to be well prepared in counter-
ing IEDs.  
Internationally, the use of IED is rampant in Af-
ghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria, stemming 
from the Al Qaeda terrorist group. The use of 
IEDs by terror networks in these countries has 
devastating effects. It has led to the loss of life, 
destruction of property, and disruption of these 
countries’ socio-economic and political instability 
[11]. Furthermore, terrorist groups continue to 
use IEDs in Africa and beyond. Some significant 
incidents have been witnessed in North Africa 
Countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, 
grappling with radical Muslim Brother Hood in-
surgents. This postulates that IEDs are a global 
security concern. Hence, counter IEDs studies 
need to improve existing literature that would 
inform preparedness policy guidelines and the 
development of C-IED strategic plans. 
IEDs were rated as the most severe threat to coa-
lition forces in the Afghanistan Mission [13]. Tal-
iban and other insurgent groups used IEDs to 
cause casualties, restrict movements, and sepa-
rate them from civilians. However, after commit-
ting financial resources, using technology, ad-
vanced training of troops, and community in-
volvement, the number of IED incidences de-
clined significantly [17]. This implies that C-IED 
efforts and preparedness are multifaceted and 
require different kinds of resources and consid-
erations. Security managers need awareness on 
where to put their resources and what strategies 
they must adopt to counter IED threats. This en-
hances their overall preparedness and can only 
be conclusive if guided by empirical data. There-
fore, there is a need for security agencies to find 
out what resources their personnel have to coun-
ter IEDs, their adequacy and suitability, and es-
tablish resource challenges they face in C-IED 
operations. This will help mitigate constraints 
and improve overall counter IED preparedness. 
From 2011 to 2013, when the use of IEDs by ter-
rorist groups began to become rampant, 4,300 
IED attacks in 66 countries caused an estimated 
65,400 deaths. In 2013 alone, 1455 IEDs instanc-
es in 41 states claimed almost 27,000 victims. 
The majority of the casualties by then were civil-
ians [2]. Similar attacks have occurred in Africa. 
For example, Somalia saw around 1700 IED inci-
dents in 2019, most of them being attacks from 
militia group Al Shabaab. Thus, more than 4,300 
IED attacks occurred across Africa in the last few 
years and have resulted in 65,400 casualties [14]. 
Although the figures suggest only a conservative 
estimation of IED attacks and associated civilian 
casualties, they reveal a clear increasing global 
trend. 
Global statistics indicate that IEDs kill thousands 
every year, cause severe physical injuries, result 
in terrible psychological injury and spread terror 
and interference across affected populations 
[14]. Their bearing on the safety and steadiness 
Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2021. Vol. 7. No 10  ISSN 2413-9009 
Section “Law and Security”   1003 
of the affected states is weighty. IEDs impede the 
political and socio-economic growth of a country 
and block lifesaving humanitarian assistance. 
The report further observed that IED incidents 
have occurred in 66 countries and territories in 
the last three years [14]. The danger of IEDs is a 
global problem. They are inexpensive and com-
paratively easy to construct. They can be made 
everywhere from various constituents such as 
industrial explosives used in construction and 
quarrying. The report can justify why security 
agencies need to be well prepared to counter this 
contemporary security challenge.  
IEDs have an unprecedented influence on the 
United Nations operations. IEDs seriously hurt 
and have claimed the lives of UN workers and 
other citizens, increased the cost of peacebuild-
ing, and impeded stability of Countries, State 
power whilst affecting the integrity of UN obliga-
tions and ability. By inhibiting peacekeepers 
from accomplishing responsibilities assigned by 
the Security Council, IEDs excessively weaken the 
political intentions and the working value of 
United Nations interventions. IEDs affect the 
movement of UN workers whenever there is a 
need to conduct negotiations, State advisories in 
an effective and timely fashion, hence profoundly 
affecting planned UN activities. IEDs also have a 
bearing on political developments when used to 
establish authority, claim regional control, divert 
attention, and probably target prominent or in-
fluential individuals and institutions, including 
the UN [1]. UN is a global organization, and the 
fact that it has identified IEDs as a weapon of 
concern demonstrates the need for security forc-
es around the world to be well prepared to com-
bat this weapon. The levels of preparedness can 
only be assessed through researches that yield 
relevant empirical data. The data so obtained can 
then be used to inform areas of intervention. 
A study in Afghanistan to examine C-IED strate-
gies and observed that academia, industrialists 
and many in defence forces have embarked on 
researches, developing of countermeasures, and 
at a substantial budget, offer scientific and tech-
nological answers to lessen the effects of IEDs, 
find and target individuals involved with the con-
struction, emplacement, and use of IEDs [7]. This 
demonstrates that countering IEDs is not a walk 
in the park. Security agencies are likely to face 
diverse challenges, and this can be minimized by 
having preparedness and counter IED strategies. 
Studies carried in Nigeria indicate that Boko Ha-
ram, a Jihadist terrorist group in North-Eastern 
Nigeria, has continuously used IEDs to injure and 
maim security forces and civilians [8]. Thus, ac-
counting for numerous recorded IED incidences 
in Nigeria. The Nigeria Police, in its C-IED efforts, 
has continuously engaged the local populace to 
combat the menace. This indicates that local 
community support is an essential component 
for security officers to consider in their quest to 
counter IEDs. Furthermore, communities are a 
source of vital human intelligence, and any secu-
rity service must co-opt community partnership 
plans in their preparedness plans.  
In assessing the mission readiness of troops in 
Somalia, it was observed that IEDs presented a 
significant threat to the country’s stabilization 
process [4]. The report observed the need for 
concerted efforts to counter IEDs. Communities 
play a pivotal role in supporting security agen-
cies with information to combat IED attacks. 
Therefore, community partnerships should be 
considered in C-IED preparedness strategies. The 
report further noted that information sharing 
and coordination at all levels and organizations is 
critical in mission readiness [4]. Thus, Kenyan 
security components will never get ahead of the 
curve in dismantling IED networks without in-
formation sharing and cooperation among secu-
rity agencies.  
Insecurity matters, preparedness is defined as a 
continuous cycle of planning, training, equipping, 
exercising, evaluating, and taking remedial action 
to ensure effective coordination [10]. The level of 
security agencies preparedness in undertaking 
their duties in any country determines how well 
they will accomplish a particular task or duty 
[10]. C-IED preparedness is a proactive strategy 
that would make security agencies ready to 
counter IEDs threats at any given time effectively. 
Being reactive when such IED incidences occur 
may end up causing response blunders that may 
result in loss of lives due to inadequate luxury of 
time to rethink response decisions and plans 
made. This, therefore, demonstrates the need for 
security agencies officers in Garissa County to be 
in a state of readiness to respond to and deter 
IED attacks. This is due to the prevalence of IED 
attacks in that area.  
Kenya has not been spared either in IED attacks 
[11]. Most of the IED attacks are carried out by Al 
Shabaab in revenge for Operation Linda Nchi, a 
joint military undertaking between Somalia and 
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Kenya that began in October 2011 when Kenya 
Defence Forces (KDF) soldiers entered into war 
zones in Southern Somalia. However, the authors 
noted that the situation remained the same until 
KDF had never withdrawn its troops from Soma-
lia. Therefore, Al-Shabaab continues to carry out 
IED attacks in Kenya to pressure the Government 
to withdraw the troops from Somalia. Most of the 
IED occurrences occur in the East of the Country 
near the Kenya/ Somalia border. However, at-
tacks have also been seen in Kenya Capital, Nai-
robi, and the most devastating one was the 
bombing of the US Embassy in 1997 [11]. Due to 
the frequency and prevalence of such attacks in 
Garissa County, the study findings posits the 
need for security agencies to be well prepared to 
counter security challenges posed by IEDs. 
There are about 38 IEDs incidences that caused 
death or injury in Kenya between 2011 and 2015 
[2]. In total, these attacks caused 425 deaths. Ci-
vilian casualties amounted to 336, while 89 were 
of security officers. Between January and Sep-
tember 2016, five attacks were documented, 
causing 20 deaths predominantly targeting secu-
rity forces. Major IED attacks targeting civilians 
on Kenyan soil included the 1998 Al Qaeda 
bombing of the US Embassy, where 212 people 
were killed and 4,500 injured [2]. This demon-
strates that IED is a real security issue in the 
country with no end to attacks in the foreseeable 
future. In addition, the study has yielded empiri-
cal data that may act as a guide towards develop-
ing a robust C-IED strategy. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Prevalence of IEDs in Garissa County, Kenya. Im-
provised explosives devices (IED) have become 
an emerging dreaded security threat in the re-
cent past. Terrorists across the globe are using 
IEDs for executing attacks. In Kenya, Al-Shabaab, 
Somalia based terrorist group believed to be the 
mastermind of all terror activities, uses IEDs be-
cause of its suitability to its strategies. Since 
2011, on the onset of the Kenya Defence Forces 
(KDF) intervention to pursue Al-Shabaab, some 
deaths due to IEDs have been on the rise. It is ob-
served that most of the IED attacks are carried 
out by Al Shabaab in revenge for Operation Linda 
Nchi, a joint military undertaking between Soma-
lia and Kenya that commenced in October 2011 
when Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) troops en-
tered into conflict zones in Southern Somalia. 
Garissa County borders, the republic of Somalia 
where the militants come from, have been affect-
ed by IED attacks [11]. Since the military inter-
vention was deployed in Somalia, there have 
been many reported cases involving the use of 
IEDs by the Al-Shabaab militants, targeting both 
security agencies and civilians [8]. The threat of 
IEDs by terrorist groups remains present in Ken-
ya, with several reported incidents occurring in 
most parts of the northeastern region [8]. Table 1 
provides secondary data on recorded incidences 
of IED attacks in Garissa from 2017 to mid-2021. 
The data was retrieved from police records, 
Garissa County. 
Table 1 – Recorded Incidence of IED Attacks in Garissa County, Kenya (2017-2021) 
Date Location Details Casualties 
29/06/2021 Liboi Police on patrol encounter Al Shabaab militia. 
Shoot out ensued, AS repulsed. 2 AK 47 and IED 
making material that was on transit recovered 
One AS suspect was killed. 
07/01/2020 Seretho, Daadab AS target demolition of communication mast 
using IED. 
Four pupils at Seretho 
primary school killed 
2 AS killed 
5 IEDs recovered 
13/3/2020 Junction of Bananey 
and Yumbis road 
A police officer from Alinjugur police station ran 
over an IED while on a patrol/response mission 
2 officers killed 
One officer sustained 
injuries 
15/03/2020 Qurnhindi area in 
Hulugho Subcounty 
The staff of the County government in an 
ambulance run over an IED emplaced on a road 
- 3 fatally injured 
- 2 seriously injured 
18/05/2020 Along Bura east 
Nanighi road of Fafi 
Sub- County 
An IED exploded behind a patrol vehicle 
damaging the rear of the vehicle 
No officer was injured 
6/07/2020 Kora kora area IED Attack attempting to bring down a 
Safaricom mast. AS repulsed 
No casualties 
11/09/2020 Near Somalia border 3 AS militia blow themselves up while setting 3 AS fatalities 
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Date Location Details Casualties 
up an IED 
31/01/2019 Sendagose, Dadaab 
Sub- County 
IED blows up, targeting a police patrol vehicle. 
The vehicle narrowly missed and was slightly 
damaged 
No casualties 
02/03/2019 Sentagose, Dadaab 
Sub- County 
IED attack targeting border police unit patrol 
vehicles 
Six officers sustained 
severe injuries 
11/06/2019 Sentaghose and 
Amuma areas 
Special forces on a security operation along the 
route encounter IED targeting one of their 
vehicles 
No casualty was reported, 
but the armoured vehicle 
was damaged 
12/10/2019 Liboi- Abdisugow 
road of Dadaab Sub-
county 
IED targeting GSU mobile patrol in a soft-bodied 
troop carrier. 
11 officers fatally injured 
7/08/2019 Hulugho village Communication mast demolished by AS militia 
using IEDs 
No casualty. One mast 
destroyed 
4/12/2019 Diiso Communication mast and a diesel generator 
destroyed by AS militia using IEDs 
No casualties. Damage to 
infrastructure 
6/06/2018 Liboi, Hara Hara 
area 
GSU officer, while patrolling the Kenya/ Somalia 
border, ran over an IED. 
5 Fatalities 
Three seriously injured 
6/05/2018 Kenya, Somalia 
border 
Police land cruiser which was ferrying soldiers 
run over an IED and later burnt by AS militia 
8 KDF soldiers killed 
2 KDF soldiers sustain 
injuries 
3/07/2018 Masalani  Police land cruiser escorting a bulldozer ran 
over an IED 
Six police officers injured 
31/05/2017 Fafi centre 
Fafi ward 
Communication mast brought down by IED 
employed by AS militia 
One teacher killed by the 
militia in the process 
16/05/2021 Liboi, A civilian land cruiser transporting Miraa ran 
over an IED 
Four civilian fatalities 
23/05/2021 Between Kulan and 
Liboi 
Police vehicle on patrol and resupplies duty ran 
over an IED  
Three police were fatally 
injured, and 8 sustained 
critical injuries 
24/05/2017 Liboi Security officers on patrol encounter an IED Five police fatalities and 
four injuries 
6/06/2017 Dadaab-Kulan road Civilian public service vehicle ran over an IED Four civilian fatalities 
Vehicle extensively 
damaged 
25/05/2017 Malelei and Kulan Police on patrol run over an IED Five fatalities 
One injured 
 
IED attacks have negatively impacted the local 
populace as it came out of FGDs with local com-
munity members: 
...IEDs have disrupted our social life. We cannot 
move freely. IEDs have scared investors, schools 
and hospitals have closed, and non-locals working 
as teachers and medical staff can no longer work 
in the interior areas of Garissa County. It’s a sad 
state of affairs since every aspect of livelihood has 
been affected... (Community 1). 
The same argument came out in an interview 
with members of the Civil Society Organization 
(CSO) that; 
…IED attacks and other forms of terror attacks 
have made us close our branches in IED prone ar-
eas. We now work within Garissa town. This has 
affected service delivery since our movements have 
been restricted to urban areas. This has made pub-
lic members in interior areas miss essential ser-
vices due to fear associated with IED attacks that 
may negatively impact our personnel… (CSO1). 
The NPS has endured security challenges and 
suffered considerable losses in assets and per-
sonnel compared to other security organs. In ad-
dition, many officers have succumbed, maimed 
or injured by the prevalent IED reinforced at-
tacks. Moreover, IED attacks cause a vicious cycle 
of socio-economic difficulties following the im-
pact it creates, notably the loss of life, property 
and assets, and psychological weakening. He fur-
ther posits that these problems create diverse 
negative coping that impedes social and financial 
capital [3].  
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 The economic effects of IED are both direct and 
indirect [3]. Directly, people have chosen to in-
vest elsewhere because of the fear of investing in 
businesses with continuous security vagueness. 
Others have closed their business entities be-
cause they dread being targeted by the Al Sha-
baab. Indirectly, many people working in mining, 
construction, and transport sectors have opted 
out of the areas affected by IEDs. This supports 
the findings that IED attacks have negatively af-
fected all livelihoods in areas where their usage 
is rampant. 
IED Hot spots in Garissa County, Kenya. IED 
hotspots are areas where most of the attacks 
have occurred, and it is anticipated that the trend 
will continue in the foreseeable future. The figure 
below shows an analysis of hotspots from the 
data obtained from secondary sources. 
 
 
Figure 1 – IED Hotspots in Garissa County, Kenya 
 
The target of IED Attacks in Garissa County, Ken-
ya. From the secondary data, there is no estab-
lished frequency pattern of IED attacks. They oc-
cur irregularly, meaning that Al Shabaab studies 
their intended target for some time before they 
eventually strike. Their modus operandi is that of 
guerrilla tactics. However, the IED attacks mainly 
target Security agents, government vehicles and 
non-locals. According to [9], the security forces 
are the victims of most IED attacks. He noted that 
the non-locals not natives of Garissa County, 
were also victims of killings in a few IED attacks 
and other government officials. IED attacks also 
target communication masts at 22% of the total 
incidents recorded in the secondary data ob-
tained. From early 2018, the frequency of IED 
attacks seems to be on an upward trajectory, and 
the end is not yet in sight, and hence NPS must 
improve its preparedness levels to counter them 
effectively. Other sectors most affected by IED 
attacks are the education and health sectors [3]. 
Teachers demand their employers to be trans-
ferred from such areas to other areas because the 
IED attacks targeted them in some cases. The 
health workers also seek such transfers. This has 
led to the diminishing of education and health 
standards in the area. 
 
Figure 2 – Targets of IEDs Attacks in Garissa County, 
Kenya 
 
Distribution and Pattern of IED Incidents in Garis-
sa County, Kenya. The study sought to establish 
the distribution and pattern of attacks and IED 
incidents over a year to establish which month 
the terrorists were likely to execute an attack in 
Garissa County, Kenya. From the data, 40% of the 
incidents happened in May. This can be directly 
linked to the fact that the Ramadhan period is 
within that period, and terrorists believe that 
they will receive many blessings if they carry out 
such heinous acts during the period (a form of 
Jihad). This can be supported by a study assert-
ing that most terror attacks in Garissa County oc-
cur in May [9]. The Ramadhan period is usually 
between the month of April-May or May-June. 
The terrorist group believes there is a reward if 
terror attacks are carried out during the Holy 
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During the FGDs, a member of NGAO also opined 
that: 
…IED attacks can be favoured by moonlight or wet 
weather. Moonlight increases visibility when dig-
ging holes to emplace IEDs in the night, whereas 
wet weather comes with dense vegetation, which 
acts as hideouts for terrorists in addition to plenty 
of water; hence AS can walk for long distances to 
their targeted areas without dehydrating. All these 
factors combined make IED attacks escalate dur-
ing certain months of the year… (NGAO2). 
 
The secondary data obtained from Police records 
and analyzed confirms the NGAOs assertions, as 




Figure 3 – Distribution and Pattern of IED incidents Over the Year 
 
Most of the IED attacks occurred between April-
July, marked by rainy seasons and festivities such 
as Ramadhan and Idd-ul-Hajj. Terrorists have 
their interpretations of these Islamic festivities. 
Geolocations of IEDs and Terrorist Related Inci-
dence in Garissa County, Kenya. Geolocation refers 
to the use of location technologies such as Global 
Positioning System (GPS) or Internet Protocol 
addresses to identify and track the whereabouts 
of connected electronic devices. Because these 
devices are often carried on an individual’s per-
son, geolocation is often used to track the move-
ments and location of people and surveillance. 
GPS tracking uses satellites to locate. It is the 
most widely used because it offers a very accu-
rate location. Unfortunately, such secondary data 
was not available in the records kept at the coun-
ty commander’s office. However, from analysis of 
other records, the following are the geographical 
locations where most of the IEDs have been em-
placed: Liboi- Abdisugow road of Dadaab sub-
county; Hulugho Village; Hara Hara stretch with-
in Liboi sub-county; masalani in Ijara Sub-county; 
Fafi centre in Fafi ward; Kulan – Liboi road 
stretch; Dadaab – Kulan road stretch; and Malelei 
in Kulan area. 
Al-Shabaab has a remarkable number of Kenyan 
fighters that fundamentally operate in the Ken-
ya/ Somalia borderline. Owing to the land vicini-
ty with Kenya, the radical group has been utiliz-
ing an IED attack strategy focusing on Kenyan 
security agencies in the nation’s northeastern 
and lower borderlines. Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, 
and Lamu Counties have endured the brunt of 
cross-boundary assaults and IED attacks [5]. The 
study supports the finding on the rampant usage 
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with the local communities, become sympathiz-
ers of the militant group and offer a supportive 
role in the emplacement of IEDs in these areas. 
This may be in the form of information on 
movements of security officers or transportation 
of IED making components. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
The study observed that Kenya had not been 
spared by the brunt of the IED menace stemming 
from the Al-Shabaab terrorist group operating 
from within and outside the country. IEDs kill 
thousands every year. The IEDs mainly target 
members of the security forces and critical na-
tional infrastructure (NCI). Civilian casualties 
have also been reported. They inflict grievous 
physical injuries, cause dire psychological harm, 
and spread extreme fear. They also disrupt 
communal economic activities. The study also 
found that IEDs are relatively cheap and easy to 
assemble. They can be assembled anywhere and 
from various materials, including commercial 
explosives used in construction, mining, and 
manufacturing. Industrial fertilizers are the pri-
mary source of its inventory.  
The study established that IEDs have become an 
emerging dreaded security threat in the County 
of Garissa. They have impacted negatively, dis-
rupting socio-economic aspects of them civilians, 
have resulted in death and injuries of Police of-
ficers and civilians and their usage by AS terror 
group continue to cause fear. The main IED 
hotspots from the secondary data obtained from 
the police records were Liboi, Sentagose, 
Hulugho, Fafi centre and Kulan. These are the lo-
cations where most of the IED attacks have oc-
curred over five years. The IEDs, in most cases, 
target security personnel on patrol or resupplies. 
Communication masts, government officials and 
civilians have as well been targeted. IED use is 
upward with no end in sight; hence security 
agencies must continuously be well prepared. 
IED attacks peak in April-July, characterized by 
wet weather and Islamic festivities of Ramadhan 
and Idd-ul-hajj. The terrorist group believe there 
is a reward if terror attacks are carried out dur-
ing the Holy Month, which explains why IED at-
tacks peak during the period above. 
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